O sistema ghent sueco e os sindicatos sob pressão

O SISTEMA DE SISTEMAS SUECOS E SINDICATOS SOB PRESSÃO.

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O sistema ghent sueco e os sindicatos sob pressão.

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A correspondência deve ser dirigida a Laust H & oslash; gedahl, Departamento de Ciência Política, Universidade de Aalborg, Fibigerstr & aelig; de 1, Aalborg & Oslash; DK-9220, Dinamarca; email: hogedahl@dps. aau. dk.

Primeira publicação: 30 de setembro de 2018 Histórico completo de publicação DOI: 10.1111 / irj.12072 Ver / salvar citação Citado por (CrossRef): 0 artigos Verifique se há atualizações.

A presença de um sistema de seguro de desemprego baseado em associação voluntária em fundos de seguro de desemprego (conhecido como o sistema & rsquo; lsquo; Ghent) e uma alta densidade sindical tem sido conhecida e bem documentada, e até conhecida como efeito especial de Ghent e rsquo; . No entanto, o sistema de Ghent, especialmente nos três países clássicos de Ghent, Finlândia, Suécia e Dinamarca, passou por uma pressão significativa nos últimos anos, e muitos pesquisadores estão se referindo a uma erosão do sistema de Ghent como mecanismo de recrutamento para sindicatos. Mas pesquisas anteriores destinadas a documentar o efeito de Ghent parecem desconsiderar as variações de quão fortemente os sindicatos se beneficiam do sistema de Ghent como mecanismo de recrutamento. Por isso, este artigo pretende investigar se todos os sindicatos também se beneficiam de um efeito de Ghent em diferentes setores e ocupações estudando o caso dinamarquês. Os dados únicos da pesquisa permitiram mapear os motivos dos assalariados dinamarqueses para se juntar ou sair dos fundos do seguro desemprego e dos sindicatos. O artigo conclui que há grandes variações entre os sindicatos dinamarqueses em termos de quão forte eles dependem de um efeito Ghent como mecanismo de recrutamento. Podemos esperar as mesmas variações nos dois outros países de Ghent, Suécia e Finlândia, porque a organização do sistema de Ghent é similar nos três países nórdicos. Além disso, o artigo mostra que essa variação poderia ajudar a explicar por que alguns sindicatos estão em ascensão em detrimento de outros.

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Edição on-line: 20 de novembro de 2018 Versão do registro on-line: 30 de setembro de 2018.

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O sistema de seguro de desemprego da Suécia é um chamado sistema de Ghent baseado em membros voluntários em regimes de seguro de desemprego subsidiados por fundos estaduais. Os fundos são administrados por diferentes parceiros sociais que abrangem diferentes setores de negócios. Os parceiros sociais lidam com a cobrança da taxa de associação, os pagamentos de benefícios aos desempregados, avaliam e afetam a opinião pública em relação ao sistema. O sistema foi reformado em 2007, o que, entre outras coisas, provocou um aumento nas taxas de adesão e um nível de substituição gradualmente menor para os desempregados. Isso fez com que 300 mil pessoas deixassem o sistema durante 2007, levando muitos parceiros sociais a ressentir-se de grandes partes da reforma.

Características do sistema UB.

O sistema sueco de seguro de desemprego (UI) foi remodelado em relação a muitos aspectos nos últimos 10 anos. As mudanças mais importantes ocorreram em 2006-2007. Durante 2006, foi investigada uma reforma do sistema de UI e as mudanças foram propostas pelo governo conservador (prop 2006/07: 15) e implementadas em 2007 após uma decisão do parlamento. O objetivo principal com a reforma foi conseguir um sistema onde se tornasse menos "lucrativo" para estar desempregado e mais benéfico na busca de trabalho, mas também para tornar os fundos da IU mais responsáveis pelo financiamento das IUs e reduzir os subsídios governamentais para a UI sistema.

Uma das mudanças implementadas foi uma taxa de associação aumentada. Anteriormente, a taxa de adesão nas IUs era de 10% do benefício total pago, enquanto 90% eram garantidos por impostos. Atualmente, as taxas de adesão representam 40 a 45% dos fundos da UI e, portanto, é mais dispendioso ser membro de um fundo de UI. Isso fez com que mais de 300 mil pessoas deixassem os regimes de IU durante 2007. No total, a participação da força de trabalho coberta pela UI diminuiu de 80% para aproximadamente 67% entre 2007 e 2009. De acordo com Melker Ödebrink, Diretora da União de Seguros de Desemprego (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO), também criou 150 mil funcionários que entrariam de outra forma para nunca entrar no sistema.

Desenvolvimento de membros da UI 2006-2018.

Outra grande mudança foi que uma correlação entre a taxa de UI e o desemprego dentro do regime específico de IU foi introduzida pelo governo conservador. Antes, o aumento do desemprego dentro de um regime de IU levou a um aumento nas bolsas governamentais. Com esta mudança, as taxas agora estão ligadas ao nível de desemprego dentro do fundo da UI. Uma conseqüência esperada é incentivar os sindicatos a ter em conta o resultado que isso trará aos desempregados em termos de oportunidades para conseguir um emprego nesse setor quando as negociações salariais forem realizadas. Isso cria uma incitação para os parceiros sociais (SPs) para defender a moderação salarial e assim aumentar o emprego. No entanto, também cria uma grande diferença de taxa de associação entre diferentes fundos de UI, uma vez que os níveis de desemprego são diferentes em diferentes setores. Isso pode trazer uma chamada seleção adversa em que os grupos com baixo risco de se tornarem desempregados escolhem não ser membros de UI, enquanto grupos com alto risco de desemprego permanecem dentro do sistema. Existe uma grande diferença entre o desemprego em diferentes setores, e há uma correlação negativa entre renda e desemprego, indicando que os índices de desemprego são mais altos em setores com menor renda média. Quando os setores são expressos em termos de sindicatos, a Confederação de Executivos e Diretoria (Ledarna) tem o maior nível médio de renda, mas representa um dos níveis mais baixos de desemprego. Os níveis mais baixos de desemprego são encontrados entre a União Nacional de Professores na Suécia (Lärarnas Riksförbund, LR) e o mais alto entre funcionários do Hotel & amp; Associação dos Trabalhadores do Restaurante (Hotell - och restaurangfacket). A correlação entre o desemprego e a renda média em cada setor causa diferenças em relação às taxas de adesão nas IUs. Por exemplo, há uma diversificação de taxas onde os setores com o menor desemprego têm as taxas mais baixas, e os setores com maior desemprego têm taxas mais elevadas. Por exemplo, a UI do setor financeiro (Finans och Försäkringsbranchens akassa) possui uma taxa de associação de SEK 85 por mês, enquanto os músicos UI (Musikernas Akassa) possuem uma taxa de adesão de US $ 445 / mês.

Outra parte da reforma resultou em uma agudização do requisito de horas de trabalho para ser elegível para a IU. O requisito de ser elegível para UI foi aumentado de 70 a 80 horas por mês, o que significa que os indivíduos hoje têm que ter trabalhado pelo menos meio tempo nos últimos doze meses para serem elegíveis para IU. Outra mudança foi que o nível de reposição diminui gradualmente quanto mais tempo você estiver desempregado. A partir de 2 de julho de 2007, o nível de desemprego é de 80% desde o primeiro dia até o dia 200. Desde 5 de março de 2007, o nível de desemprego é de 70% a partir do dia 201 e 65% do dia 301 (ver tabela 1).

Subsídio de substituição relacionado ao rendimento.

Abastecimento diário médio.

A oportunidade de receber um período de benefício prolongado e adicionar mais 300 dias para a IU terminou em 2 de julho de 2007. O novo máximo é de 300 dias com uma exceção de assistência à infância (se você tem filhos menores de 18 anos, você pode obter mais 150 dias ). Após 300 dias, os desempregados entram no programa de garantia de emprego e desenvolvimento que é uma garantia de desemprego (UA) com atividades e coaching para encontrar um novo emprego.

O Escritório do Trabalho (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) foi substituído pelo Conselho Sueco de Seguros de Desemprego - IAF em 2004. A IAF formou diretrizes para todas as IUs. O objetivo da emissão de regulamentos foi melhorar a uniformidade das avaliações de fundos da prática de IU adequada e a IAF simplificou a visão geral de todas as IUs. Além disso, os novos regulamentos da UE 883/04 e 987/09 foram introduzidos pela UE em 2018. O objetivo do novo regulamento da UE era simplificar e modernizar os regulamentos e a linguagem. A livre circulação foi ampliada e os trabalhadores agora têm, até certo ponto, a oportunidade de transferir crédito por períodos de trabalho em outros países membros.

Todos os fundos de UI são administrados por SPs e coordenados pela União de Seguros de Desemprego (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO) e foram contra um aumento na taxa de associação e a maioria das mudanças na proposição do governo conservador (prop 2006/07: 15). Muitos dos regimes de UI concordam que o novo sistema provavelmente irá prejudicar o fundamento da estrutura atual da UI, que pode eventualmente levar à nacionalização de todo o sistema de UI. As principais confederações sindicais; A Confederação Suíça dos Sindicatos Suiços, a Confederação Sueca das Associações Profissionais A SACO e a Confederação Sueca dos Trabalhadores Profissionais TCO foram muito resistentes a todas essas mudanças. Eles argumentam que isso tornará o mercado de trabalho menos flexível, pois os funcionários terão medo de mudar de posição. De acordo com a TCO, é importante que a Suécia tenha um sistema de segurança razoavelmente equilibrado em que o seguro-desemprego seja um pré-requisito para a abertura da rápida transformação no mercado de trabalho provocada pela globalização. É também um pré-requisito para o acordo coletivo que é a base do modelo sueco. O sindicato ressente-se das mudanças e argumenta que, se houver menos segurança nos regimes de IU, os trabalhadores exigirão mais segurança em seus acordos coletivos, o que tornará a rodada de negociações salariais entre sindicatos e organizações de empregadores ainda mais difícil. Os fundos da UI e os sindicatos também estão muito preocupados com a perda de membros da UI e as consequências que isso irá trazer.

Fonte: Kjellberg, 2018.

Principais características do sistema UB.

Seguro desemprego.

O sistema sueco de IU é um chamado sistema de Ghent baseado em uma associação voluntária em regimes de IU subsidiados por fundos estaduais. A maioria dos fundos de UI estão ligados a sindicatos, no entanto, as operações de fundos de investimento da UI e os sindicatos são separados. Os regimes de IU abrangem setores e trabalhadores específicos. Um regime UB - Alfa kassan, é, no entanto, separado dos sindicatos e dos grupos de interesse específicos e aberto para todos os trabalhadores de todos os setores. Os fundos da IU cobrem apenas os trabalhadores despedidos devido à escassez de trabalho e, em geral, os trabalhadores devem ter trabalhado na Suécia em algum momento para serem cobertos pelos fundos da UI. Além do fundo de UI, e para garantir o nível de renda em caso de desemprego, os indivíduos podem obter um seguro de renda adicional, que é financiado apenas por taxas de adesão. Isso também é voluntário e geralmente administrado por sindicatos. Todos os membros de um fundo de UI podem optar por entrar neste programa para garantir um maior nível de substituição se for redundante.

Elegibilidade:

O desempregado tem que ter menos de 65 anos e ter sido membro e pagar uma taxa de adesão ao regime de IU de doze meses ou mais para ter a oportunidade de se candidatar a um benefício relacionado com o rendimento com base no salário anterior. O indivíduo, além disso, deve ter trabalhado em média 80 horas por mês nos últimos doze meses. Um requisito comum também deve ser registrado como desempregado e estar ativamente buscando trabalho no Swedish Public Employment Service. Para ser elegível para o seguro de renda adicional, o indivíduo deve ser membro de um regime de IU.

Os trabalhadores podem dispor da IU por um máximo de 300 dias, cinco dias por semana. Se o trabalhador tiver menores de 18 anos quando o 300º dia for atingido, ele receberá mais 150 dias. O seguro de renda adicional também dura 300 dias.

Taxas de substituição:

O nível de compensação depende de se você trabalhou a tempo inteiro ou parcial durante o período de qualificação. A compensação básica máxima é SEK 320 / dia. O benefício relacionado com a renda significa que o empregado pode receber até 80% do salário anterior, mas não mais de SEK 680 por dia (cinco dias por semana). A partir de 2 de julho de 2007, o nível de desemprego é de 80% desde o primeiro dia até o dia 200. Desde 5 de março de 2007, o nível de desemprego é de 70% a partir do dia 201 e 65% do dia 301 para membros da IU com filhos menores de 18 anos.

As IIs são financiadas por taxas de adesão à UI e pelo imposto sobre a folha de pagamento pago pelos empregadores e autônomos do estado. As taxas de adesão consistem em uma taxa básica e uma taxa de desemprego. A taxa básica é paga por todas as pessoas ligadas à UI e a taxa de desemprego é paga apenas por todos com emprego. As taxas diferem entre os regimes de benefícios da IU e estão relacionadas ao número atual de desempregados do regime. A taxa de desemprego pode ser de US $ 300 SEK por mês por empregado.

Envolvimento SP:

Na Suécia existem 30 regimes de IU, alguns com conexão a sindicatos ou outros parceiros sociais. Os fundos da UI cobrem diferentes setores. As taxas de associação diferem e dependem da situação do setor empresarial específico e do número de desempregados no regime de IU no momento. Antes de 2007, se você se juntou a um dos sindicatos conectados a um fundo de UI, você também se juntou ao fundo de UI e vice-versa, hoje essa correlação mudou de acordo com Melker Ödebrink Diretora Administrativa da União de Seguros de Desemprego (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO).

A maioria dos regimes de IU abrange setores específicos e estão conectados a sindicatos no mesmo setor empresarial e seu envolvimento esteve presente no sistema UB nos últimos 130 anos, portanto, seu envolvimento está bem estabelecido, legitimado e confiável. Além disso, todos os fundos do SP II seguem os mesmos regulamentos e são supervisionados pelo Conselho Sueco de Seguro de Desemprego (IAF). No entanto, as IUs têm requisitos diferentes para que os indivíduos sejam cobertos por esse fundo específico de UI, por exemplo, a UI Acadêmica (AEA) exige uma formação acadêmica para ser elegível para sua IU, outros exigem que o indivíduo trabalhe em um setor específico.

Assistência ao desemprego.

No caso de o empregado não se qualificar para o benefício relacionado com a renda ou se não tiverem membros em outro regime de IU, ele / ela pode solicitar o benefício básico da Alfa Kassan. Se a UI expirou, todos os indivíduos independentes da participação na UI podem entrar em um programa de garantia de desenvolvimento de trabalho e administrado pelo Serviço Sueco de Emprego e depois receber mais benefícios financeiros. O programa de trabalho e desenvolvimento inclui treinamento, educação e atividades para motivar os desempregados a encontrar um novo emprego.

Para receber a compensação básica que o trabalhador fez redundante deve se candidatar a Alfa-kassan para esse benefício. O trabalhador tem mais de 20 anos e está registrado como desempregado e busca ativamente emprego. Para entrar no programa de garantia de trabalho e desenvolvimento, a compensação de IU deve ter expirado e o funcionário deve cumprir todas as fases do programa até encontrar um novo emprego.

A compensação básica pode ser recebida por um máximo de 300 dias, cinco dias por semana. O programa de garantia de trabalho e desenvolvimento consiste em três fases nos primeiros 150 dias, nos segundo 300 dias ea terceira fase é de 450 dias. O benefício básico máximo para um não membro de UI é SEK 320 / dia. Se o candidato a emprego tiver tido direito à UI antes de receber 65 por cento do salário anterior ao entrar no programa de garantia de emprego e desenvolvimento, caso contrário, o indivíduo receberá a remuneração mínima em 223 SEK / dia.

Os não membros das UIs têm de pagar uma taxa administrativa de seu benefício básico da Alfa kassan. A taxa hoje é SEK 24. A remuneração básica e o programa de garantia de emprego e desenvolvimento são financiados por impostos.

Os parceiros sociais não estão envolvidos.

Participação do SP no regime UB.

A fase de desenvolvimento.

O início ou a alteração do regime UB geralmente começa por uma fase de desenvolvimento. Nesta questão, os correspondentes devem levar em consideração e denunciar situações de mudanças substanciais nas principais características do (s) programa (s) existente (ões) da UB, bem como a introdução de um "novo regime" ou "regimes" que substituem, parcial ou totalmente, um anterior em termos de lógica / lógica e / ou características principais.

As reformas de UI mais importantes projetadas durante a última década foram resultados de um processo político após a eleição do governo conservador em 2006. Os SPs, como fundos de UI ou sindicatos, não estavam envolvidos no processo de design. No entanto, a União de Seguros de Desemprego (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO) e as principais confederações sindicais LO, SACO, TCO foram convidadas a comentar as mudanças sugeridas, uma vez que são órgãos de referência em certos tópicos. Isso significa que, antes que o parlamento considere as mudanças propostas relacionadas ao seguro desemprego, alguns SPs têm a oportunidade de comentar a proposta. Portanto, foi fundamental para todas as mudanças sugeridas na proposta do governo. No entanto, a crítica dos diferentes SPs / sindicatos não era exatamente a mesma em todos os casos de acordo com o investigador de Ossian Wennström na SACO, uma vez que todos os SPs priorizam diferentes aspectos do sistema UI.

Em 2006, a aliança dos partidos políticos conservadores e liberais apresentou uma proposta (prop 2006/07: 15) para mudar grandes partes do sistema de UI chamado "Seguro de desemprego para o trabalho". Apesar das críticas maciças dos sindicatos, das IU e do público, as mudanças foram implementadas em etapas durante 2007, a fim de tornar a regulação da IU mais rígida. No entanto, eles não foram convidados para a mesa de design nem suas críticas afetaram o projeto de acordo com a Confederação Sueca de Trabalhadores Profissionais TCO e a União de Seguros de Desemprego SO.

Os SPs têm sido ativos na formação dos programas UB durante o último século. No entanto, eles não são eleitos politicamente e, portanto, não são aceitos como políticos ou projetistas. As reformas são projetadas, investigadas, propostas e depois o parlamento vota sobre a implementação ou não das mudanças. A União de Seguros de Desemprego é no entanto um órgão de referência em certos tópicos e, portanto, seu envolvimento é legitimado até certo ponto durante a fase de projeto.

O envolvimento do Unemployment Insurance Union-SO é previsível, mas episódico, uma vez que eles são um corpo de referência em alguns tópicos. O envolvimento ocorre principalmente a nível nacional, mas muitos sindicatos estão ativos no debate a nível local e influenciam a opinião pública.

O envolvimento não tem sido muito bem sucedido dado que as mudanças na regulação da UI foram realizadas independentemente do fato de que alguns SPs estão contra ela, eles se tornaram enfraquecidos e sofreram grandes perdas de membros.

A fase de implementação.

Os sindicatos têm filiais que são responsáveis pela administração de 30 fundos UI e eleger seus próprios funcionários, cobrar taxas de adesão e orientar seus membros da IU. Eles seguem as leis estabelecidas pelo parlamento e são supervisionados pela IAF. O programa UA é administrado por instituições governamentais O Serviço Sueco de Emprego Público e financiado através de impostos pela Agência Sueca de Seguro Social.

Os fundos da UI controlam a administração e as operações das IUs que são analisadas e controladas pela IAF. Os próprios sindicatos não implementam as mudanças, no entanto, os ramos sindicais estão ativos no processo de implementação, principalmente através da união, os regimes de UI criaram Arbetslöshetskassornas samorganisation - SO.

Alguns dos sindicatos têm uma conexão política com o Partido Social Democrata da Suécia e, portanto, têm uma posição estratégica, uma vez que podem afetar os políticos com posições e poder para votar em questões onde os sindicatos têm interesses. Eles também têm um mandato de seus membros para representá-los sobre esta questão, que também é uma posição estratégica.

A fase de gerenciamento.

Os sindicatos têm desde o final do século XIX dando apoio econômico aos desempregados e, portanto, o envolvimento de SPs em regimes de IU está bem estabelecido na Suécia. A maioria das IUs está ligada aos sindicatos e, muitas vezes, a participação em um sindicato é igual à adesão em seu programa de UI. Os regimes de IU abrangem setores e trabalhadores específicos. Por exemplo, a Construction UI (Byggnads A-kassa) é limitada aos trabalhadores da construção empregada e pintores na Suécia, enquanto o fundo do Hotel e Restaurante UI cobre funcionários em restaurantes, cafés etc. A UI dos Líderes (Ledarna) exige que seus membros tenham uma posição de liderança dentro da administração ou negócios para serem elegíveis para seu fundo de UI.

Os mais de 30 fundos de IU interagem através da União de Seguros de Desemprego (SO), que é uma agência de serviços para os fundos de UI. Por mais de 100 anos, o sistema UB foi feito em cooperação com os sindicatos e, posteriormente, as organizações empregadoras como The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) estiveram envolvidas (ver capítulo 2.2.3).

A maioria dos funcionários do SP responsável pelos programas da UB são administradores, advogados e informantes e todos eles são educados pela União de Seguros de Desemprego - ASSIM. O conselho do fundo da UI geralmente tem experiência de trabalhar nos negócios que representam e a maioria dos administradores são especialistas em certas áreas, como direito, educação e assuntos de contrato. O conselho responsável é comummente eleito pelos membros em reuniões anuais.

Todos os SPs seguem a lei sueca sobre UI e têm os mesmos regulamentos. Suas operações são controladas pelo Conselho Sueco de Seguro de Desemprego (IAF). Juntos, eles geralmente são representados pela União de Seguros de Desemprego - ASSIM.

Os fundos de UI são financiados para 40-45% pelas taxas de adesão da SPI UI e o restante é coberto pelo financiamento governamental. Antes da mudança de UI que ocorreu em 2007, as taxas de adesão à IU eram de 10 por cento e não estavam relacionadas à taxa de desemprego no regime de IU. Hoje as IUs são menos dependentes dos fundos do Estado e são mais dependentes das taxas de adesão.

Um aspecto específico sobre o qual NC pode basear-se de forma proveitosa refere-se a aspectos orçamentários e não apenas em relação ao envolvimento do SP na coleta de contribuições e na entrega de benefícios. De fato, uma característica negligenciada a ser considerada considera o gerenciamento de fundos SP que eles podem entrar na posse e administrar para fornecer os serviços. Nesta perspectiva, as reformas financeiras restritivas dos últimos anos podem ter afetado a forma como SP opera, com consequências a serem avaliadas.

Durante a concepção das mudanças no sistema UB que teve lugar em 2006-2007, muitos SPs foram contra essas mudanças, uma vez que os fez aumentar os níveis das taxas de adesão e tornar-se mais rigoroso em relação a regras que tornam os membros elegíveis para benefícios de UI. Também os membros dos regimes de IU em setores com altas taxas de desemprego foram afetados negativamente, uma vez que, após a reforma, se correlacionou com as taxas de adesão. Isso foi criticado por SPs, porém não alterou a reforma da IU. Muitos trabalhadores deixaram as IUs que também tiveram um efeito negativo sobre os níveis de associação sindical, uma vez que estas estão altamente correlacionadas. Os próprios SPs tornaram-se enfraquecidos e sofreram uma grande perda de associação como conseqüência do aumento das taxas de adesão.

Link para outros programas.

Os fundos UI têm uma interação regular com o Serviço Público de Emprego sobre a aplicação das regras das operações de IU. Para ser elegível para os programas da UB, os trabalhadores redundantes devem ser registrados como candidato a emprego no Serviço Público de Emprego. Além disso, o Serviço Público de Emprego lida com o sistema UA e assume a administração quando o receptor de benefício UI não é elegível para ele.

Os sindicatos não têm nenhum compromisso educacional, no entanto, eles negociam com organizações de empregadores em relação a um acordo de reestruturação. O acordo de reestruturação dá apoio adicional aos empregados redundantes sob a forma de assistência educacional e assessoria para encontrar novos empregos. Este suporte é considerado um complemento para os programas UB e é negociado pela PTK (representando trabalhadores) e Svenskt Näringsliv (A confederação da empresa sueca - representando empregadores).

Os parceiros sociais, como o movimento sindical sueco, sempre tiveram como uma das principais tarefas para combater o desemprego. O pleno emprego é um alvo óbvio para os sindicatos - mas também a segurança para o membro individual na situação de conversão. A LO e a Confederação da Empresa Sueca criaram, portanto, um seguro para o período entre empregos dentro do contrato coletivo. O seguro para contribuições para aposentadoria é parte deste acordo. O seguro fornece aos trabalhadores com mais de 40 anos um benefício adicional na notificação de rescisão é dado por redundância.

O acordo de reestruturação que complementa os programas da UB criou organizações encarregadas de apoiar trabalhadores redundantes para encontrar empregos alternativos. Essas organizações são chamadas de conselho de segurança (Trygghetsrådet, TRR) e TRS.

A fase de monitoramento.

A maioria dos sindicatos segue continuamente o desenvolvimento do funcionamento da UI. Particularmente importante para os SPs é avaliar a cobertura, as taxas de compensação, as taxas de adesão à UI e o desenvolvimento da associação. Por exemplo, Mats Essemyr, pesquisador da Confederação Sueca de Trabalhadores Profissionais TCO, explica que compilaram dados de várias fontes para analisar o desenvolvimento e usá-lo como parte de sua influência política.

Há comissões avaliando as reformas da UB antes de implementar mudanças no sistema. As avaliações são feitas por funcionários contratados para o governo (Instituto de Avaliação da Política do Mercado de Trabalho - IFAU), de grupos de partidos políticos, cientistas e SPs.

Os SPs avaliam constantemente os efeitos do sistema UB e o governo também encomende avaliações para tornar o sistema mais eficiente em uma base regular. De acordo com Melker Ödebrink, SO faz uma avaliação regular sobre quantos desempregados realmente recebem uma compensação que é 80% da sua renda anterior. Eles podem usar essas avaliações em sua missão para convencer os decisores, e os níveis de benefício devem ser levantados.

Muitos SPs escrevem relatórios e publicações e também são ativos nos debates públicos nos jornais sobre sua visão do desenvolvimento do sistema UB. Os SPs também são ativos em mídias sociais, blogs etc. O resultado é um debate mais ativo.

Os SPs têm um papel relevante no processo de avaliação quando se trata de moldar a opinião pública e as idéias de seus membros. Isto é relevante, uma vez que os sindicatos representam, em conjunto, 71% do número total de trabalhadores na Suécia (2018). No entanto, os termos e condições da IU são decididos completamente pelo parlamento.

Monitorando o envolvimento do SP no sistema UB.

ASSIM - a União de Seguros de Desemprego representa, instrui e informa os fundos de UI sobre procedimentos, regras e regulamentos. IAF - O Conselho Sueco de Seguro de Desemprego assegura que as regras sejam seguidas e que a administração seja tratada corretamente. A missão da IAF é supervisionar o papel dos fundos UI e isso é feito regularmente.

Se a IAF verificar que um fundo de UI violou regras juridicamente vinculativas, a IAF anuncia objeções para financiar operações ou impõe o fundo UI para tomar medidas corretivas dentro de um determinado período de tempo. A IAF também pode decidir sobre a retirada de subsídios estatais para um fundo que não cumpra os regulamentos. A IAF também pode recuperar os subsídios estatais que já foram pagos. Se a IAF descobriu que o Serviço de Emprego violou as regras juridicamente vinculativas, a IAF está inclinada a informar o Serviço Público de Emprego e o governo.

Observações finais.

Debates públicos e discussão política.

Desde as mudanças em 2007, o debate foi desencadeado sobre como SPs e o governo devem lidar com os UBs e como melhorar o sistema UB. Ultimamente, um dos debates tem sido a questão de se deve ou não tornar o sistema UI obrigatório em vez de mantê-lo voluntário como é hoje. Since the great membership loss in the UI funds in 2007, this has been introduced as a possible solution to make the UI system more stable and to make more people insured. According to Ossian Wennström, researcher for The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) and board member of the Academics UI (Akademikernas erkända Arbetslöshetskassa – AEA), this could result in an obligatory UI administrated by the government or an obligatory UI administered by the UI regimes depending on how such a system would be constructed. However the obligatory UI has not been investigated nor is it encouraged by the SPs involved today. The government is also hesitating on whether or not the obligatory UI is the solution even though this was formerly their position. According to Melker Ödebrink, the Administrative Director of the Unemployment Insurance Union (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO), a change towards an obligatory UI wouldn’t solve the problem and get more people covered by the insurance. The reason for this is that there are other requirements than being a member to be eligible for the UI and that creates a threshold for being covered by the UI funds. Even though SO disagrees with the government, concerning most of the recent changes in the UI, they believe that the system with the UI funds operated by the SPs as it is today is the best way to handle the UIs.

Some SPs are advocating for making the requirements for being eligible for the UI lower, however this could, according to Mr Ödebrink, lead to a moral hazard where employees won't enter the system until they are unemployed. According to Ossian Wennström a change in one section of the system affects all the other and therefore the system has to be investigated further before implementing further changes such as an obligatory system.

SP statements.

The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisaiton TCO) tco. se/FileOrganizer/TCOs%20webbplats/Publikationer/rapporter/TCO-granskar/2006/TCOgranskar_nr9_okad_otrygghet. pdf - The Swedish Trade Unions Confederation (Landsorganisationen LO) lo. se/home/lo/home. nsf/unidView/9C70A29BB492CB7CC1257217004CD1B4/$file/Remiss_akassa2.pdf Unemployment Insurance Union (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO) samorg/so/filer. aspx? typ=dokument&id=-16330214128102 The confederation of Swedish enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) svensktnaringsliv. se/multimedia/archive/00003/YTT2006-201_3120a. pdf.

Calmfors L, Forslund, A och Hemström, M (2002), ”Vad vet vi om den svenska arbetsmarknadspolitikens sysselsättningseffekter?”, Rapport 2002:8, IFAU, Institutet för arbetsmarknadspolitisk utvärdering. Calmfors, L, Marthin G (2018), ” Vad bör göras med arbetslöshetsförsäkringen?” Ekonomisk Debatt , årgång 39, nr 6 2018 www2.ne. su. se/ed/pdf/39-6-lcgm. pdf Carling, K, Holmlund, B och Vejsiu, A (2001), “Do benefit cuts boost job finding? Swedish evidence from 1990:s”, Economic Journal , årgång III, oktober. Carling, K, Edin P-A, Harkman A och Holmlund B (1996), “Unemployment Duration, Unemployment Benefits and Labour Market Programs in Sweden”, Journal of Public Economics , vol 59, s. 313–334. Fredriksson, P och Holmlund, B (2004),”Hur ser en optimal arbetslöshetsförsäkring ut?”, Ekonomisk Debatt , årgång 32, nr 4, s. 22–38. Kjellberg, Anders – (2009) The Swedish Ghent system and trade unions under pressure, Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility, Research Reports 2018:1 trs. sagepub/content/15/3-4/481.abstract Kjellberg, Anders (2018) Kollektivavtalens täckningsgrad samt organisationsgraden hos arbetsgivar-förbund och fackförbund, Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility, Research Reports Clasen, Jochen, Viebrock, Elke, (2008) Voluntary Unemployment Insurance and Trade Union Membership: Investigating Connections in Denmark and Sweden. Journal of Social Policy, 37, 3, 2008, 433-452 translate. google. se/translate? hl=sv&sl=en&tl=sv&u=http%3A%2F%2Fsps. ed. ac. uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0017%2F23138%2FJSPGhent08.pdf&anno=2.

Comentário.

Assessments and comments.

One advantage in having different SPs involved in the UB system is that they focus on different aspects when designing and evaluating the UB system. For instance SO, which is concerned about the administrative consequences different changes will have on the UB system, UI funds and the Public Unemployment Service place more focus on the management aspect, while trade unions have a more political approach to the UI debate. This probably makes the discussion and development of the system more diverse and the SP involvement can therefore bring important aspects to the design-table. According to Melker Ödebrink, the involvement of the SPs was not very well handled by the government in 2007, since they had a very short time to give critique and comments on the proposal before the decision-makers took the decision. However, according to Mr Ödebrink, the trend seems to be improving and the SPs are given more time to comment change-proposals for the UI system.

Perceived strengths and weaknesses.

One problem, illustrated in figure 2, above, is the consequence of having a UB system where different sectors are covered by different UIs. This new system was introduced in 2007; before the UI regimes had the same membership fee. Presently, one problem with the differentiated UI system might make groups with a low unemployment-risk stay outside the system and the people with a high unemployment risk stay within the system, a so-called adverse selection. This consequence creates a distribution problem within society. However the UI membership fee differentiation is here to stay according to research on the matter (Uddén, 2018) and therefore a solution on how to make the UI funds attractive enough and give workers incentives to pay the increasing membership fees have to be developed according to SO and SACO representatives but also according to the government.

Melker Ödebrink believes that the Swedish Ghent system has an advantage since there have been very few mistakes in the UI payments in comparison to the situation in other systems. The administration and control of the UI benefit receivers is complicated but the Swedish UI funds handle this administration well. In comparison to other countries, very few mistakes in the Swedish UI have been found. He also believes that having SPs handling the UIs is an advanctage since they have insight in the sector where they are active and can administrate the UI system more easily.

One strength in having SPs involved in the UI debate is that they, according to Ossian Wennstöm Mediator and researcher for The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges akademikers Centralorganisation SACO) and board member of the Academics UI (Akademikernas erkända Arbetslöshetskassa – AEA), are active in the areas where members tell them to be. This means that they can actively prioritise and unite to represent the ideas of their members. If the UB system was handled entirely by the state perhaps this dimension would be lost. However, Mr Wennstöm concludes that SPs should be present, active and rouse public opinion on matters concerning the UB system. Still, he believes they should not get the power to vote on these matters since we live in a democracy and the decision-makers should be elected as representatives in the parliament as they are today. The SPs don't always agree and this is also an important feature in the system since this makes the question more openly discussed.

Mats Kullander and Ingrid Broman, Oxford Research.

Referências.

Proposition 2006/07:15, ”En arbetslöshetsförsäkring för arbete”, 2006-11-15. Calmfors, L, Marthin G (2018), ” Vad bör göras med arbetslöshetsförsäkringen?” Ekonomisk Debatt , årgång 39, nr 6 2018 Kjellberg, Anders (2018) Kollektivavtalens täckningsgrad samt organisationsgraden hos arbetsgivar-förbund och fackförbund, Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility, Research Reports Uddén Sonnegård, Eva, SOU S 2018:04 Hur bör arbetslöshetsförsäkringen utformas? underlagsrapport till den parlamentariska socialförsäkringsutredningen. samorg/so/filer. aspx? typ=dokument&id=-16343000414985 tco. se/FileOrganizer/TCOs%20webbplats/Publikationer/rapporter/TCO-granskar/2006/TCOgranskar_nr9_okad_otrygghet. pdf iaf. se/ afaforsakring. se/Forsakringar/Forsakring-vid-arbetsbrist/ lo. se/home/lo/p3/resources. nsf/vRes/facket_forsakrar_tavel3_agb_a6_09_pdf/$File/tavel3_AGB_A6_09.pdf psfu. se/uploads/files/3_hur_bor_arbetsloshetsforsakringen_utformas. pdf.

Entrevistas.

Melker Ödebrink Adminsitative Director of the Unemployment Insurance Union (Arbetslöshetskassornas samarbetsorganisation - SO) Ossian Wennström Mediator and investigator for The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges akademikers Centralorganisation SACO) and board member of the Academics UI (Akademikernas erkända Arbetslöshetskassa - AEA)

Mats Essemyr Researcher for the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation TCO)

Προσθήκη νέου σχολίου.

Country updates.

Sweden: Latest working life developments – Q3 2017 Country update 31 Οκτώβριος 2017 EurWORK Sweden: Latest working life developments – Q2 2017 Country update 24 Αύγουστος 2017 EurWORK Sweden: Latest working life developments – Q1 2017 Country update 28 Απρίλιος 2017 EurWORK Sweden: Latest working life developments – Q4 2018 Country update 25 Ιανουάριος 2017 EurWORK Sweden: Latest working life developments – Q3 2018 Country update 21 Οκτώβριος 2018 EurWORK.

Spotlight report 23 November 2017 EurWORK.

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Research in Focus 20 September 2018 EurWORK.

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The Role of the Trade Unions in Social Restructuring in Scandinavia in the 1990s.

Professeur de sciences politiques et directeur du Centre de recherche sur le marché du travail (CARMA), à l’université d’Aalborg au Danemark. Il a écrit des livres et des articles sur les syndicats et leurs relations avec la puissance publique, sur les mutations de l’État providence, ainsi que sur le marché du travail et les politiques de l’emploi.

Raccourcis.

See also aussi.

Revue française des affaires sociales.

Pages : 556 Éditeur : La Documentation française À propos de cette revue Site de la revue.

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Social restructuring and the search for a “Scandinavian model”

If welfare state developments during the post-war period could be seen as a “politics against market” experiment (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996), welfare state restructuring and policy developments during the 1990s have surely become more like “politics with markets” or even “markets against politics”. State interventionism has been abolished in quite a number of policy areas, there has been a call for more liberalism on the labour market, and corporatism has fallen into discredit. Slogans like “from welfare to work” and “to make work pay” have called for new solutions to societal problems, and in some systems unemployment benefits and social assistance have been lowered, and people forced to accept job offers with little consideration for the quality of the jobs. At the discoursive level, the welfare state and its socialization of rights has been replaced by more individualization of risks (Crespo and Serrano Pascual, 2002). Nowadays, neo-classical analyses, “new public management” and other justifications for these changes are popular. The trade unions, once deeply integrated into the political decision-making processes in many countries, have been blamed for many inflexibilities and disincentives in the labour market and have suffered a loss of power in the face of neo-liberal and neo-conservative offensives.

But there was a diversity of paths to transforming the welfare states throughout Europe during the last two decades (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000, Lödemel and Trickey, 2000; Pierson, 2001; Sarfati and Bonoli; 2002, Barbier, 2003). Almost all European countries have had to cope with unemployment problems and social reform questions (Gallie and Paugam, 2000). Activation systems and social protection systems have been reformed in different ways, so there is no uniform welfare state restructuring and no clear European convergence process to be witnessed. States have chosen differently. The “one-size-fits-all” solution so popular in international organizations like the OECD and IMF and on the right wing of the political spectrum does not seem to correspond to the choices of policy-makers. The political answers and adaptations to external changes of economic and cultural elements differed. Through social pacts, the trade unions also achieved some political importance in more European countries during the 1990s (Fajertag and Pouchet, 2000; Jørgensen, 2002b), and in some systems corporatism still plays an important role.

Among the countries that performed relatively well during the 1990s, securing high employment rates and low unemployment figures, are the Scandinavian countries, [1] [1] “Scandinavia” normally covers Denmark, Norway, and. especially Denmark. Non-liberal reform measures are part of the picture. No doubt the Scandinavian countries still set standards for reforming labour market policies and social protection systems, even though the pressure on competitiveness has been persistent, including permanent wage moderation. But – as documented in this journal – the answers in Scandinavia have not been uniform either. The largest changes are found in Sweden, including an apparently dramatic change of corporatist arrangements. But none of the countries have been willing to pay the price of a “blue revolution”, showing that reforming welfare systems and labour market policies need not happen at the expense of social solidarity. In Sweden, attempts to raise employment and reduce unemployment at the expense of inequality and wage dispersion have also proved unpopular. Equality, high productivity and low unemployment have corresponded well in the Scandinavian countries (Rothstein, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 1999), and their performance has simply been better than low-income countries like Spain, Italy and Greece with weak social welfare systems and also better than France, Germany and the UK. As to the question of policy profiles, there might not have been major qualitative changes in the Scandinavian countries, but the way policies are decided and implemented – the policy style (Jørgensen, 2002a) – has changed in a number of respects. In this article, the question of the role and political participation of the trade unions in Denmark and Sweden will be addressed, investigating the political orientation of the trade unions, the access and influence in relation to the politicaladministrative system, and the ways in which trade unions have been important political actors.

Traditionally, all Scandinavian countries are classified as corporatist with very strong labour movements (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991; Treu, 1992; Crouch, 1994), but as neo-liberal offensives and conservative governments have tried to deregulate and make labour markets more “flexible”, the trade unions and the corporatist arrangements have been put under pressure. Was there a common “model” as to the role of the trade unions in social restructuring in the 1990s? Did the respective trade unions suffer a great loss of power in the systems or did they still succeed in influencing policies? And did they change their fundamental preferences and priorities during the 1990s?

My main thesis is that reforms of labour market policies and social protection systems are closely related to the presence and actions of the trade unions, and that corporatism as well as trade union lobbyism is a continuing element of Scandinavian policy developments, but also that the role and orientation of the trade unions have changed more in Sweden than in Denmark. During the 1990s, “the Scandinavian model” broke down in a number of ways. Thus, similarities between the systems in relation to welfare reforms and labour market arrangements look a bit arbitrary, due to the fact that choices of policy-mix and incorporation of trade unions in the political processes have not been uniform. The way trade unions interact with the political and administrative system reveals their behaviour as political actors. Their role in social restructuring is, however, also a question of political influence and of self regulation in collective bargaining. Collective bargaining regulates not only wages and working conditions but also broader and “softer” issues, which normally are characterized as part of social policy, including pension rights, vocational training and education, and sick leave. Therefore, social reforms cannot be seen only as a question of social restructuring and political decisions at state level, but are also part of the development of collective bargaining.

In relation to the European Union, Scandinavian choices have differed. Sweden (and Finland) joined the EU in 1995 and adapted in several ways to economic and monetary integration. Denmark has been an EU member since 1973, but voted “no” to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and “no” again to the euro in 2000. Denmark had the courage to implement an active, Keynesian fiscal and labour market policy in 1993-94 and had success. Norway decided not to join the EU, but to coordinate its economic policies in accordance with EU decisions. The Social Democrats came into power again in 1993, in Denmark, and in 1994, in Sweden, after the 1991-94 conservative government (while the Social Democrats won power in Finland in 1995, but lost power in Norway in 1997). The close relationship between the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party has often been described as one of the prerequisites of societal corporatism, but as demonstrated below, this is not necessarily the case. Correspondingly, common pressures for adaptation in the labour market will not be met by a uniform reorganization of negotiation structures and (de) regulation. National answers will be formulated. In this article, I shall try to present an alternative line of argumentation to the widespread theory that economic pressures will determine and bias social restructuring.

Negotiation systems and pressures for regulation.

It has been a popular view for some time that internationalization and “globalization” of economic relations through more intense competition will lead to deregulation, flexibilization, decentralization and undermining of social systems. But empirically there is no trend of convergence to be witnessed. Theories of convergence suppose that regulation systems and welfare state arrangements are to change in line with economic requirements. The essence of this kind of thinking is that structure will follow function. But the functionalist essence of the convergence theory draws the wrong parallel from how the market is supposed to be functioning – e. g. by “natural selection” through market competition – to how politics and professional regulation are functioning. This depends on quite another set of social and political logics and historical institutional factors within each country (Jørgensen, 2002a). To make nation states act and react, there is much more than international market forces at play. The EU’s economic and political regime, of course, exerts some pressure on the member countries, but it is still the individual states that develop and implement adaptation strategies. Therefore, one has to analyse the important changes in institutions and strategies within the national frameworks and then look for divergences and possible convergences.

As to the two Scandinavian countries included here, comparative considerations are given the character of analyses of “most similar cases”. Common traits (small open economies, strong labour movements, comprehensive welfare states) make a reduction of complexity possible from the outset, and then we can go on to analyse the historical-empirical variances in the factors exposed.

The Nordic countries have different connections to the EU. Finland has gone into the economic and monetary union without any reservations, while the Danish people refuse to do so. Sweden has also chosen to stand outside (and Norway is not a member at all). Furthermore, different monetary regimes exist in the countries: Denmark has a fixed foreign exchange quotation, while Sweden, Finland and Norway have floating rates of exchange.

Economic developments were also divergent in the 1990s. Sweden and Finland faced a severe recession at the beginning of the decade, almost blocking economic growth. In Sweden, devaluation and political efforts at market adaptation made the system unstable for some years. Norway, due to its oil resources, was not heavily affected by economic troubles, and the Norwegian economy recovered well from its bank crises and smaller recession at the beginning of the 1990s. Denmark had economic problems from the late 1970s onwards, and with the exception of the period 1984-86, recovery did not occur before the mid-1990s, which was also due to the new 1993 government’s mix of Keynesian fiscal policy and active labour market policies. Socially, Sweden and Finland were shocked by the unusually high unemployment figures that rose sharply from 1990. Norway had small fluctuations compared with Sweden and Finland, and an unemployment rate below 5 per cent did not cast very dark shadows over the social picture. Denmark had severe problems in the first half of the 1990s but became a European success story within a few years. As to welfare reforms, Sweden and Finland were more dependent on solving the public expenditure problem than Denmark and Norway. Cost containment in public spending also occurred in Norway but here because of political will – not because of economic pressure. External pressures varied slightly, but major differences were related to internal pressures and policy choices.

As to adaptation of negotiation systems in the 1990s in the Scandinavian countries, Denmark decentralized wage negotiations, as did Sweden, where macrocorporatism and formal centralization partly collapsed, but was again counterbalanced by strong coordination mechanisms and conciliation institutions on sectoral levels (Dølvig and Vastiainen, 2002; Elvander, 2002a and b). Norway re-centralized negotiations and Finland maintained strong centralization even under hard economic conditions. The conditions for effective coordination of wage policy and public policies do not exist only in centralized or fully decentralized wage negotiations, but are to a high degree dependent on the capacity for both horizontal as well as vertical coordination of arrangements and agreements (Traxler et al., 2001). A weak vertical steering of incomes policy can easily provoke poor results. It is thus coordination capacities and systemic “flexibility” that count. And the Nordic countries have shown a remarkable degree of stability and adaptation, promoted by cooperative actor strategies. National collective agreements are still the dominant form of regulation of wages and working conditions in all Nordic countries. However, incomes policy has not been seen in Sweden, while this is the case in the other countries. Also in the public sector, general collective agreements are made at national level, but implementation involves decentralized collective actors as well. The dual role of the public sector as both employer and interventionist agent in society has resulted in heated political debates on public actions. New regulations are called for. As about one third of all wage earners are employed by the state, counties and municipalities, this is a factor not to be underestimated when evaluating the actions and priorities of the trade unions in social restructuring in the 1990s.

Political participation by the trade unions.

Reforms in social and labour market policies have taken different shapes and directions, but do we also see different actor systems in the three countries and are trade unions following different strategies? Even if the trade unions are present in all the systems, variable goals, resources and results can be found both in labour market regulation and in political decision-making. In order to highlight the role of the trade unions in the restructuring of the welfare and labour market systems, it is appropriate to look at both access structures and ways of influencing public policy in the three countries. Institutionalized forms of influence can be aimed at both politicians and bureaucrats, and the political-administrative system can give privileged positions to interest organizations in corporatist arrangements. These kinds of inclusion of interest organizations can be of a segmented nature, the best known of which are perhaps the political and administrative bodies proposing and implementing labour market policies (Hermansson et al., 1999). Non-institutionalized forms of influence can vary from direct actions (strikes, sit-downs and so forth), direct contacts (lobbyism), agenda-setting via the media and permanent contacts with the media.

If we look closer at the modes of political participation, making a distinction between interplay with politicians and with bureaucrats, combining this with the degree of institutionalization, we arrive at different forms of corporatism and lobbyism (see Figure 1).

The rules governing behaviour tend to be vague or even ambiguous when it comes to lobbyism, which definitely is not the case in more institutionalized forms of corporatism. By investigating the modes of political participation, we also get a picture of the policy style of the 1990s in each country. The question is whether some form of corporatist co-determination has survived in Denmark and Sweden, and if new kinds of lobbyism have replaced “old” corporatist arrangements (Schmitter, 1974; Schmitter and Lembruch, 1979; Öberg, 1994). The role of trade unions in the restructuring of social protection systems and labour market policies is accounted for by national stories of labour market and policy developments during the 1990s.

The analysis also shows that there is plenty of room for manœuvre in economic and social policy in each country. No evidence is found to support the popular view of welfare states being economically inefficient and only creating disincentives to work. The policies implemented have not been retrenching welfare spending, and even improvements of social standards and employment arrangements can be found. Universalism has been the firm basis of equality-oriented policies, especially in Denmark. The labour market and social policies regimes have been preserved. At the foundation of these regimes the powerful trade union movement is found. A well-organized and mobilized working class has been the basis of co-operative strategies, both professionally, in relation to employers’ organizations, and politically, where co-operation with Social Democratic governments has often been strong. But throughout the 1990s changes occurred in this respect. It is important to stress that, in Scandinavia, unemployed people remain in the trade unions, and the unions develop comprehensive programmes and initiatives for reintegrating unemployed members and for improving the public social and activation systems. The trade unions are strong political actors.

Trade unions in all Scandinavian countries have traditionally been in favour of strong welfare states and an activist approach in public policies. More specifically, this amounts to positions like these, found around 1990:

a comprehensive and powerful public sector with social responsibilities for all citizens . This must encompass social protection, social services, education, housing, and also address other social needs. A high degree of universalism is fundamental – also for the legitimacy of the welfare state.

full employment and active employment and labour market policies , making it possible for the national economy to be both competitive, balanced and to find fair solutions to problems. This presupposes co-ordination of macroeconomic policies and sectoral policies, and the social partners (or “the labour market organizations” as they are called in Scandinavia) must tackle wage bargaining within a course or corridor compatible with productivity developments and wage increases in other countries.

all citizens are entitled to basic social protection regardless of their labour market status . There must be a flat-rate basic security, financed by high taxes, but here is also an earnings-related unemployment security. This Ghent-system is the only element of social insurance, and it is administered by the social partners (except in Norway).

the Scandinavian countries are small decentralized countries in which municipalities perform most social services, and have strong democratic traditions to build upon. The municipalities are in strong positions in the state system, they allocate the majority of public expenditures, and they perform most welfare tasks, close to the citizens. There must be short power distances everywhere.

income distribution must be relatively equal , and this is to be secured by a progressive income tax system. The trade unions are in favour of solidaristic policies, both in wage bargaining and in public interventions. Poverty rates are accordingly low.

As social and labour market arrangements rest upon individual rights, women are not economically dependent on a male breadwinner, and gender equality is to be considered one of the pillars of the Scandinavian welfare states. Women have the highest participation rates in Europe, and they are represented on an equal basis in the trade unions with men. The unions have been “feminized”.

the strong trade unions have high organization rates, ranging from 56 per cent to about 85 per cent, and a broad coverage of collective agreements secure that minimum wages are relatively high and that few people are without professional protection. A tradition of voluntaristic regulation is very strong in Denmark and Sweden. The Swedish labour movement has often been considered one of the most powerful in the world, penetrating most fields of Swedish society, from local religious boards to national decision-making bodies.

Let us see what happened during the 1990s, how the orientations developed in each country and eventually changed the preference structure of the trade unions, and what degree of success the trade unions have had in influencing public policy-making.

Apparently, the most dramatic changes have taken place in Sweden. Although firm retrenchment policies (Pierson, 1994, 1996) have not been implemented, the public sector has been on the defensive, and the traditional strong corporatist bodies in Swedish policy have been changed in a number of ways (Svensson, 2001). The very existence of a well-defined “Swedish model” might be questioned. Special attention is therefore given to the Swedish case first.

A historical compromise between capital and labour laid the foundation of the (old) Swedish industrial relations system in the 1930s (“Saltsjöbadavtalet”). With this “New Deal” came intensive public interventions in the labour market, which was especially strong from the 1950s onwards. The social partners were placed in privileged positions as corporatist decision-makers and implementation agents. A centralized system paved the way for the concept of the Swedish model with strong fiscal policies and active labour market policies, formalized in the so-called “Rehn-Meidner Model” (Kjellberg, 1998; Rothstein, 1992). The labour movement was in a strong position and Social Democratic majority governments could extend the industrial and political strength of the trade unions to the political-administrative system. Parallel developments took place in Norway in the 1930s, but the importance of active labour market policy and administrative corporatism never reached the same high level as in Sweden. In Denmark, the private labour market regulations system was established much earlier, before 1900. The “September Compromise” of 1899 was the first basic industrial agreement in the world and it is still defining the rules of the game in collective bargaining. Basic agreements saw the day in Sweden in 1938. [2] [2] In Norway this happened in 1935, in Finland in 194.

Goals in public policy in all Scandinavian countries have been to secure full employment, balancing economic developments and implementing social reforms in order to grant social citizenship to everyone. The trade union movement has been advocating social reforms and welfare state arrangements and the Social Democratic parties have been in governmental positions most of the time since the 1930s. One of the important traits of the systems has been the combination of centralization and decentralization in both industrial relations and in public decision-making. Early on, the union workplace organizations representing the national associations at enterprise level became part of recruitment, staffing and bargaining processes. And at national and sectoral levels, collective agreements were made, constituting a three-tier system of collective bargaining – in Denmark from the 1930s, in Norway from the 1940s, in Finland from the 1960s, and in Sweden from the 1950s, with the most centralized system in accordance with the wishes of the Swedish employers’ confederation, SAF. This strong centralization in Sweden disappeared again during the late 1980s and 1990s, and also to some extent in Denmark, due to actions by the employers. This has left the Swedish LO (Federation of Trade Unions) with decreasing power and increasing legitimacy problems. LO used to have a powerful influence over affiliated unions due to the abolition of balloting on collective bargaining results from the late 1940s. [3] [3] Unlike Denmark and Norway, where the use of membership.

With the expansion of the public sector since the mid-1960s, the traditional blue-collar unions have been supplemented by new types of white-collar unions (with a majority of women), also strengthening the role of bargaining cartels and corporatism within the public sector. At every political and administrative level – municipality, county and state – unions are present on internal advisory boards and take part in decision-making arrangements, which strengthens the dual system of representation and co-operation. In the public sector, the unions have a membership basis of over 90 per cent, while the private sector has figures down to about 70 per cent in Denmark and about 75 per cent in Sweden. [4] [4] Norway has no union unemployment insurance funds (which. Tension arose between the central organizations in Sweden, as decentralization of bargaining structures developed over the past two decades and corporatist arrangements came under attack. The centralized system was partly dissolved, and the trade unions were no longer united.

Labour legislation in the 1970s covered a wide range of areas (labour law, wage earners’ funds, job protection and so forth) and was a political reaction to a radicalization of the union agenda, which in the 1980s made the employers’ federations more unsatisfied with the “historical compromises”. The solidaristic wage policy, functioning as an extra-governmental form of incomes policy, was unpopular too. A general industrial conflict in 1980 and subsequent new strategic considerations on the side of capital paved the way for a more militant approach, and this counter-offensive was implemented in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The strategic position of the social forces and class organizations was shifting. Capital (especially multinational companies) has been on the offensive, trying to undermine the traditional axis of LO and SAF.

On the side of the wage earners, the organizational picture has also been shattered. TCO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees, founded 1944) and SACO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, founded 1947) have become very important in both the industrial and the political sphere. They were also appointed members of many commissions and boards in the Swedish system (Lewin, 1992).

In 1992, SAF simply withdrew from corporatist representation, among which the AMS (“Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen”, the leading board of the labour market authorities) was the most prominent (Rothstein and Bergström, 1999). Administrative corporatism suddenly seemed to break down. SAF would no longer give legitimacy to policies, which, to an increasing extent, were made by leading administrators following New Public Management concepts, and macrocorporatism was now seen as a potential obstacle to market clearing and social restructuring. So strategic orientation in a pro-European and market-oriented direction also paved the way for this dramatic shift on the side of the employers. The political system reacted in an unusual non-Social Democratic way to this.

Today, representatives on the boards are granted a personal mandate by the government, and, in actual fact, it is still people from the labour market organizations who are the decision-makers. But this situation also gives the organizations the chance of operating more freely as lobbyists. E eles fazem. The unions also use direct contacts more often, especially trying to influence politicians. Employers’ organizations rely more heavily on intense contacts with bureaucrats and civil servants. But the reorientation shows that political agenda-setting is now considered more important than the implementation stages of policy development.

SAF wanted a “change of system” of corporatist representation, but ironically, the employers’ confederations were forced to participate in political corporatism in the form of central wage concertation under the auspices of the state in the 1990s, following proposals from a tripartite “national mediation commission”, the Rehnberg Commission. Strong fragmentation of the bargaining system, high unemployment figures (8.2 per cent in 1993), and the need for reconciling wage increases, inflation and social reforms were met by a state-led effort of political re-regulation in 1991-95. Stabilization agreements were extended to all kinds of unions. This re-centralization threatened the tradition of strong self-regulation by the social partners, and, in 1997, they made a new kind of “compromise”, an industrial agreement (called “Industriavtalet”), which again stressed institutionalized self-regulation, but with neutral mediators at national and sectoral levels (Elvander, 2002a and b). State conciliation is now out for most union members. Private conciliation and regulation has replaced state conciliation for about 60 per cent of the total labour market. But this new negotiation system is not favoured by TCO and SACO.

The old Swedish “model” was difficult to identify at the beginning of the 1990s. More market-friendly policies were adopted and the unemployment benefit system was depreciated (Svensson, 2001; Klitgaard, 2002). The strong state interventionism of the 1970s vanished in many areas. Much of the labour legislation of the 1970s was abolished (on job security in 1974, union workplace representatives in 1974 and co-determination in 1976), and the role of solidaristic wage policy also lessened. Unemployment insurance benefits were – officially due to problems of public budgets – lowered from 90 to 80 per cent in 1993 and again to 75 per cent in 1996, and then upped again to 80 per cent. Work requirements were strengthened and the period of support shortened. In this respect, the Swedish unemployment benefit system was slightly winged. Childcare was also reformed at the beginning of the 1990s, with support for more private opportunities. Free choice was introduced in several policy areas. Trade unions warned against the effects on social redistribution. The social restructuring of the protection system was, then, negotiated with the trade unions. The social dialogues could continue, but often in new forms and more political arenas.

The labour market organizations still send representatives to almost all committees and most commissions, although one-person commissions have grown in number over the last decade. Still, within labour market and social policies, the trade unions have firm representation in preparing legislation and programming policy implementation.

So what conclusion can be drawn concerning the question of the role of the trade unions in Sweden in the 1990s? The way private influence is institutionalized changed for certain. Political corporatism in Sweden was more state-led in the first half of the 1990s, as the economic crisis also hit Sweden extraordinarily hard, but social pacts were more restricted to wage moderation, without incorporating a large number of social protection issues, as was seen in other European countries. Advisory councils and bipartite bodies (on supplementary insurance and job security schemes, for example) were set up with union representatives. In relation to administrative corporatism the trade unions used to be member of the executive board of government agencies, which have great autonomy in Sweden. Now “personal mandates” dominate, and this makes it much more difficult to hold organizations accountable for public decisions and arrangements, but the appointed representatives still have the opportunity to influence these. In 1960, interest group representatives held 69 per cent of the seats in government agency boards within the labour market field, but the figure in 2000 dropped to 23 per cent (Svensson and Öberg, 2002). [5] [5] But a trade union economist is now head of the National. Trade union participation and influence may not have disappeared in Swedish administrative corporatism, but the old tripartite government bodies no longer exist at central or decentralized level, with the exception of the Labour Court and the Pension Insurance Fund. The Swedish trade unions are very occupied at the moment with political questions in relation to pensions. The class struggle will also be a struggle for future pension and cash benefits.

When it comes to non-institutionalized forms of participation, these have clearly grown in importance for the trade unions. Direct contacts with the politicians are frequent and of wider scope, and contacts with bureaucrats occur on a daily basis. Consultations take place all the time at all levels. More seldom is the use of direct actions (strikes, sabotage and so forth) and the use of consulting agencies, lying between the public and the private sector, becoming political actors for organizations with major resources, is still of marginal importance. Media contacts, however, are becoming more and more important. From a recent survey it is clear that the political representatives are the most important addressees (Svensson and Öberg, 2002). Fifty-five per cent of the trade unions report contact with public representatives at least once a month (whereas employers’ organizations are down to 39 per cent, which is still not a low figure). Lobbying is a normal political activity of trade unions. One should also notice that over the last two decades about 70 per cent of the trade unions have created separate departments for information, media contacts and public agenda-setting. The class struggle has, in part, been transformed into a media struggle.

The strong political orientation of trade unions is also documented by another Swedish investigation, suggesting that LO is paying special attention to the Social Democratic Party – which is in power and has organizational and ideological affinity to LO – and this also accounts for TCO and SACO, but these organizations also emphasize direct contacts with ministries (see Table 1, Svensson and Öberg, 2002). These figures, from 2000, also confirm that employers are focusing more on civil servants.

The confirmation of politically-oriented unions is strong. Especially in relation to administrative corporatism, Sweden now performs differently from its neighbouring corporatist countries. Agenda-setting and political influence in commissions and other arrangements on the input side of the political system do not seem to have been weakened on the side of the trade unions. Empirical findings stress the importance of lobbyism and direct contact with politicians and bureaucrats, but they do not tell us exactly how powerful the unions have been. Indirectly, one can see that they did not succeed in preventing the political authorities from partly destabilizing social security, reducing benefit levels and not improving occupational safety and health.

The existing programmes have been trimmed, but most of them have not been transformed. State interventionism has weakened, while the public sector has been enlarged, and self-regulation has been reintroduced in industrial relations. There are good reasons to believe that the trade unions are still considered key political actors in the Swedish system, although the central organizations have been weakened, and this has paved the way for social restructuring not always to the advantage of the wage earners. Sweden has witnessed a partly successful employer-driven deregulation and decentralization in the labour market, but the universal welfare state arrangements have not been dismantled and support for universalism is still high.

The early foundation of a private negotiation and conflict resolution system in Denmark made LO (Danish Federation of Trade Unions, founded 1896) and DA (Danish Employers’ Federation, founded 1898) central actors in the industrial system and significant political actors as well. The first corporatist body in Denmark was formed in 1898, a year before the “September Compromise”. The social partners regulate issues which in other systems are handled politically (i. e. working hours and minimum wages) and they also run a “private” industrial court system (“Arbejdsretten”). The historical heritage of the Danish system is reflected in the fact that only marginal changes have since been made to the original agreement (in 1960, 1973 and 1993). Strong and powerful collective actors are able to modify and adapt rules to changing circumstances and pressures more easily than legal regulations, and the mechanisms for resolving conflicts work quickly and efficiently. But it is the collective actors that count, not the individual worker or employer, as in most other European systems.

The Danish system is a highly voluntaristic regulations system combined with strong labour market policy arrangements in which the social partners are the most important decision-makers. The central actors and some academics (Due et al., 1994) refer to this as the successful “Danish model”. The limited legal and political intervention in Denmark generates problems, as not all employers and employees are covered by collective bargaining, and this applies to almost one quarter of the total labour force of 2.8 million people (Due et al., 1994; Scheuer, 1996). Because of this, in 2002, the EU forced the Danish authorities to accept supplementary legislation in relation to EU directives, while throughout the 1990s the social partners and the Ministry of Labour did not want any political intervention at all but practised implementation only through collective agreements.

In the post-war period, the Danish industrial relations system was highly centralized. A state mediator played an important role in avoiding open conflicts when agreements ran out. This is not always the case today and open general conflicts do break out, the last one occurring in 1998. Politicians had to stop the conflict after one week. Agreements are normally subject to endorsement by the membership of union ballots, which gives respect and legitimacy to the regulations (Ibsen and Jørgensen, 1979; Scheuer, 1998). In the organizational system, based predominately on crafts and not on industrial unionism as in Sweden, LO is still the most important actor with 1.4 million members, but white-collar industrial unions have also come to play important roles, representing, amongst others, union members of the FTF (Central Confederation of Salaried Employees, founded 1952), the AC (Central Confederation of Professional Associations, founded 1972, the members of which have academic degrees) and certain “service” unions. There is a very complex pattern of trade unions in Denmark, but only the three central organizations have permanent places in corporatist arrangements. Nowadays, LO organizes only about two-thirds of all members, FTF about 15 per cent, and AC 7 per cent. In LO, private-sector unions are still dominant and the close collaboration between LO and DA means that private-sector views and influences are dominant, too. Problems do arise from the fact that DA represents all the employers in labour market discussions and decision-making processes.

Even during the widespread economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, Danish trade unions were able to recruit more members, which was also due to the close link between the trade unions and the unemployment insurance funds. Union density rose by 3 per cent between 1975 and 1989, peaked in 1995 at 84 per cent and is now down to 81 per cent. Decentralization of wage bargaining and collective agreements accelerated during the 1990s – one could talk of a “centralized decentralization” (Due et al., 1994) – and was operated mainly along industrial lines, which are inappropriate within the predominantly general and craft membership structure of the organizations. A solution was sought in the unions’ bargaining cartels, but success has been limited. [6] [6] Structural change on the side of the employers’ organizations. In the public sector, two bargaining cartels also exist, for the state and municipalities respectively, but here the organizations are deeply involved in daily co-operation with employers in the public institutions. Internal administrative corporatism was thus strengthened during the 1990s (Jørgensen, 2002a) and this is an important factor in the resistance to rapid social reorganization.

A Social Democratic-led government took office in 1993 and started to reform labour market policy and rules concerning unemployment benefits (after proposals made by the “Zeuthen” commission in 1992). Important arrangements were made during the 1980s in labour market policy, such as reforms of the job offer scheme (originally invented in 1978) and the first efforts to give unemployed people rights to vocational training and further education. But, on the whole, the labour market policy was not very active; it was in deep need of reformulation. In 1993, a new policy-mix with expansive financial policies and a new need-oriented activation system was introduced, together with a reform of the rules for having access to renewed unemployment benefit. From being able to stay 7 years in the system, it gradually came down to 4 years during the 1990s. This was decided by a Social Democrat-majority government. The level of unemployment insurance benefits was not reduced, but new rules might be seen as creeping disentitlement. Young people under 25, in particular, were compelled to take up job offers at reduced pay or enter into education. This tightening of rules went hand in hand with the introduction of a personal action plan for each unemployed person, starting different kinds of activation. Training and education are now the most important measures used in the new system, administered by 14 regional labour market boards. These boards are corporatist bodies with representatives from the trade unions, the employers’ organization, the municipalities and the county (Jørgensen, 2000, 2002b).

Administrative corporatism in Denmark was strengthened in the 1990s. Here, deliberative processes and joint decision-making took place, programming the implementation of regional labour market policy, assisted by the public employment service system. Finally, with the support of the trade unions, leave schemes were introduced in 1994: educational leave, sabbatical leave and parental leave. Only the latter is still in use now, but all three schemes proved popular. Many trade unions were active in influencing municipal decisions on better childcare. This was also a way of promoting female labour market participation. And improvements were seen in almost all of the 275 municipalities. The employment rate rose during the 1990s and over 200,000 new jobs have been created since 1993.

Wage increases were moderate during the 1990s, even if unemployment dropped remarkably quickly from 12.4 per cent in 1994 to 5 per cent in.

1999. Foreigners talk of the “Danish job miracle”, with a flexible labour market, effective labour market policies, growing employment and no serious economic problems in the balance of payments (Cox, 1998; Auer, 2000). On the other hand, an early retirement scheme, introduced in 1979, has proved very popular, and early retirement, combined with smaller numbers of young people entering the market, now seems to bring future problems to the supply of labour. Discourses are now moving from unemployment problems to those of supply and quality of labour.

From the late 1980s, employment-related pension schemes were introduced in private collective agreements, and they have been extended ever since. This is a first step away from the universal welfare state arrangements in Denmark and a first step towards European integration, as these earnings-related schemes break with the principle of citizenship and tax financing. This change has happened without much public debate on solidarity and change of system, but it was the trade unions who advocated this “innovation”. The trade unions, both private and public, pressed for more political and social reforms, and, in fact, the political system improved some of the schemes during the last part of the decade. However, the Danish labour market actors and the political system were reluctant to reform schemes for immigrants and refugees. In the first half of the decade, they were put in marginal positions on the labour market and many of them have never been given a chance in this respect. They now constitute about one half of all the people on social assistance, administered by the municipalities, and much political attention is given to these groups in Danish society. The role of the trade unions was not very flattering in this respect, and joint campaigns run by employees and public authorities for more social inclusion have only recently become successful, overcoming the merely symbolic character of the inclusive labour market. Prevention, retention and integration are the three elements of the Danish inclusion strategy. But help has been given primarily to those already employed. Thus, the top organizations of the employers and trade unions seem to have reduced corporate social responsibility to mean internal social responsibility rather than external social responsibility (Bredgaard, 2003). “Social chapters” in collective agreements give opportunities to employ people with reduced working capacities at reduced wages, but only a few thousand people have been helped in this way until now.

In social policy, restructuring has taken more forms and paths (Kautto, 1999; Jørgensen, 2002a). Service provisions have been improved in a number of areas, especially childcare and home care, but altered in accordance with NPM concepts, while income transfers, both in relation to temporary, “passive” benefits and activation services have been lowered in some respects. Trade unions are in favour of a public guarantee that all children between one and five years of age can have a place in a kindergarten or some other type of public care, and this was almost achieved in 2000, partly because of increased government subsidies. Local trade unions are often most active in trying to influence decentralized politics and administration to the benefit of their members. In Denmark, the welfare state is first and foremost a welfare municipality.

In sum, the Danish welfare system has only been subject to moderate changes. A new “social reform” was established in 1998 without political conflict, but also without commission work, and the trade unions were mostly interested in the law on active social policy, even if their interest in social policy matters increased throughout the decade – as did that of the employers’ federation, perhaps to even a greater extent. Activation occurred both in the state system and in the municipalities, and the social partners were also represented in the social policy arena in 1998 through “local coordination committees”. This constitutes yet another corporatist arrangement in Denmark. The social partners have broadened their political attention and agenda-setting activities to almost all policy areas, which was not the case only two decades ago.

The policy style of the 1990s changed in some areas, becoming more consultative and intergovernmental. Sometimes the political system made its own proposals and only allowed the social partners to comment on these drafts, thereby relegating them to lobbyists. There are now fewer official commissions, as documented in Table 2 (source: Christiansen and Rommetvedt, 1999, p. 198).

It is, however, a qualitative question what the importance is of this numerical reduction of political corporatism seen against the increasing reliance on administrative corporatism in the Danish system. Some might think that neo-liberal policy changes will undermine the faith in the efficiency and effectiveness of corporatism and increase lobbyism, the non-routinized contacts (Svensson, 2001; Christiansen and Nørgaard, 2003). The Danish developments show that there is no causal connection at work here. Both corporatist and lobbyist arenas have become of vital importance to the trade unions, also given the fact that Denmark has often minority governments and a tradition for incorporating the interest organizations in political life as “affected parties”. Previously, reforms were planned first, through extensive and protracted committee and commission work, usually resulting in a lengthy report. Legislation took place afterwards. In the 1990s, politicians no longer accepted this significant time lag, and partially changed the policy style in a number of policy areas. “Quicker” decision rounds were made with selective incorporation of interest organizations and with partially hidden agendas. This applied to reforms of adult vocational training and education and part of labour market legislation as well. Many social policy decisions were taken in budget rounds behind closed doors in negotiations between government and local government organizations. But the results were often disappointing, with loss of legitimacy in several cases. Accordingly, the trade unions (and other interest organizations as well) have tried to use informal contacts and forums to influence public policy, and they often take the initiative. Figures of growing intensity of contact with the central authorities 1976-2000 look like this (Christiansen and Nørgaard, 2003, p. 109):

The result has been a more pluralist picture – already visible in the 1980s under conservative governments – but the privileged positions of labour market organizations have not been fully disarmed, administrators always contact the private organizations, and corporatism is still a systemic trait. Government, parliament and the bureaucrats must rely on the co-operation of trade unions, but the norm for involving the social partners has been weakened.

The Social Democratic-led governments from 1993 have created new forms of access and influence for the organizations, and mostly so for the old class organizations. The most resourceful organizations are also given the best opportunities to be present. But class relations are no longer so unambiguous, and LO loosened its ties to the Social Democratic Party in 1995 (and fully broke with the party in 2003). LO wanted to be able to act more independently and now have contacts with all political parties and bureaucrats at all levels. The reciprocity and transparency of contact patterns have been reduced. Findings suggest, however, that the stronger the resources and capabilities on the side of the organizations, the stronger they will be integrated and have influence (Christiansen and Nørgaard, 2003). No neo-liberal Eldorado has been established by setting the trade unions outside political influence and power in Denmark. Even a new Liberal-Conservative government from 2001 did not dare to break with the strong social partners, although the government wanted a “work first” approach to activation policy and a “package of freedom” to be implemented. Radical changes have not been seen yet.

Conclusion: national adaptation and trade union lessons.

Social restructuring in Scandinavia is a mixed result of legislation, public policies, corporatist arrangements and self-regulation in collective bargaining. The social and labour market reforms of the 1990s have brought into focus one industrial relation and four public policy topics:

securing real wages and improvements of working conditions, working time, and quality of jobs, despite even more decentralized bargaining patterns.

from passive income support to active policies, improving the activation systems with special attention given to the importance of job training and further education and thereby improving employability.

fighting unemployment by strengthening incentives to take up a job and having duties and sanctions implemented along with offers, also reforming the unemployment insurance system and the public social assistance schemes.

increasing activity rates, which is heavily dependent on public policies and social services, with support for childcare as decisive.

income security supported by employment promotion. Public reforms try to encourage people to enter the labour market, even those who previously were non-workers (single mothers, disabled persons, older people, immigrants and refugees), while still guaranteeing basic welfare for all citizens. Paid work is now seen as the best and most important form of welfare and social integration, and each person has – morally – to take care of finding a job for herself or himself.

Social policy has been more closely linked to labour market measures and goals. Societal values change, and the new discourses stress individualization of risks as opposed to earlier socialization of risks. This also applies to women. Changes in policy orientation generate new policy issues and problems to be dealt with – but the answers are national, diverging. Common discourses are to be compared with different social restructuring results. No retrenchment policies, de-collectivization, or precarious employment relations have been tolerated in the Scandinavian countries, and the universal welfare state has not been seriously threatened, also because of the stability of the collective bargaining systems and the political influence of the labour movements. Path-dependent and path-shaping developments are still evident, but specific to each system. Even the Swedish changes and adaptations cannot be characterized as path-breaking developments, but we can talk of new labour market regimes in Sweden and Denmark, covering relations, norms and political regulations at all levels. Collective agreements, conflict resolution and cooperation between the social partners have been restructured – and more radically so in Sweden. Formative moments and different perceptions among the actors still explain much of the changes. Different national solutions framed by the universal welfare state have been the result – also due to the fact that the trade unions have used their strong political position in the systems to prevent a retrenchment policy from being implemented. Needless to say, the trade unions are not the only type of actor to take credit for this, but they have been influential social and political forces.

Continuity and stability more than flexibilization and neo-liberal restructuring have been the results in the Scandinavian countries. The pillars of the labour market and policy systems have not been shaken. The central role played by trade unions in wage determination and macroeconomic steering, in employment policies and development of social policies is still alive and kicking. But a multiplicity of wage earners, organizations, and interests are now to be seen in the landscape. [7] [7] In Norway, the LO (Confederation of Trade Unions, founded. The LO and its opponent employers’ federation are to lose the pivotal position in the systems. As collective agreements are no longer made solely at the central level, standardization has gone and more horizontal ways of coordinating understandings and actions have been the result. Internal pressures and changes in power positions and organizational patterns are some of the most important challenges to the Scandinavian trade unions. It is not “globalization”, “flexibilization” or “individualization” in themselves. Increasing feminization, white-collar employment and trade union activity have changed the operational standards of the systems, but mostly in the direction of stronger support for public welfare arrangements and combinations of “flexibility” and “security” (which might be called “flexicurity”).

Complex patterns of influence and incorporation of the trade unions emerged in the Scandinavian countries in the 1990s, Sweden being the system undertaking the largest changes, especially with the declining importance of administrative corporatism. But in Denmark, this “old” type was cemented and even enlarged during the 1990s, and corporatism experienced no decline in Finland or Norway either. [8] [8] In Norway and Finland, it was possible to revitalize. Political lobbyism and administrative lobbyism developed in Sweden alongside weaker institutionalization of influence by the interest organizations. We can conclude that even if the policy styles were changing, the social and welfare state policy profiles were not.

Building on national analyses and generalizations from other studies, we can summarize lessons drawn by the trade unions in the 1990s in a renewed preference structure . The Scandinavian trade unions are in favour of:

voluntaristic regulation of wages and working conditions by the labour market organizations , building on the principle of “free” collective bargaining and trustful collaboration at both national, sectoral, and enterprise level.

universal welfare state arrangements in relation to social protection, social services, education, housing and so on. The trade unions are defending the welfare state in most respects.

active labour market and employment policies must de decided on and implemented in order to secure full employment and active participation in the labour market . Unemployment is unacceptable, unworthy and a waste of economic resources. Activation policies must give real offers to the unemployed, and no “work first” approach is accepted. An inclusive labour market must be developed both with the help of public policies and through collective agreements.

solidaristic wage policies and progressive income taxes are still supported. Redistributional effects must be obtained, but at the same time achievements are to be rewarded.

active gender equality policies must be developed and the municipalities must take responsibility for sufficient childcare and other arrangements relevant to labour market participation . Parental leave is now seen as a very important welfare element.

highly institutionalized social dialogues between the labour market organizations and public representatives at all levels , making collective actors central for both agenda-setting, programming and implementation of public policies.

Last but not least, this summarizing needs at least two qualifications. First, in relation to labour market pensions, non-universal forms are now accepted as supplements to general pensions financed through taxes, and one also has to remember that the liberal social insurance principle behind the unemployment insurance system is constantly defended by the unions. Second, some changes have also occurred in relation to the interpretation of solidarity and equality; similar results are not always claimed by the unions and their members. The tendency is that equality is being substituted by equity. Evaluation of results are becoming more norm-based. The support for a compressed incomes scale is perhaps now stronger in Denmark than in Sweden, who used to be the front-runner. These changes in preference structure signals potential breaks with hereditary values.

One last conclusion: trade unions and other interest organizations have a natural place in a modern democracy and corporatist arrangements, both politically and administrative ones, and have shown their ability to find more balanced and fair solutions to social and economic problems. There are good reasons for giving private organizations privileged positions in relation to public policy making and implementation, and I prefer to talk of chosen strategies of “cooperative adaptation” (Jørgensen, 2002a, pp. 247-248). Apart from this, highly institutionalized ways of trade union participation in informal dialogues have grown in number and importance both in relation to politicians and bureaucrats – and in relation to the media as well. Networking has become almost an “industry” of its own. Networking implies open and shifting contacts, while institutionalized corporatism has permanency and closed structures. Seen from the perspective of the state, the question is how interest organizations can contribute to the steering capacity of the public sector, while the question from the perspective of the organizations is how to safeguard the interests of the members, normally through coalitions and strategic alliances. Often the state has potentially a more powerful position – and in Sweden this has been distinctly so. But the Rehn-Meidner recipe has been seriously challenged by the “Europeanization” of the Swedish export industry and right-wing policies. But corporatism is still developing in the shadows of the state.

The stronger the collective negotiation systems are, the easier it will be to combine market pressures with social protection, and the adaptation strategies of the actors will be more predictable too. The actors will so to say insure themselves against violent upheavals (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). The Scandinavian negotiation systems are created with reference to small open economies able to handle fluctuations in the international economy and different developments of productivity (formalized in different economic “models”). Corporatist traditions for policy development have been one of the most important buffers to pressure from the environment and from international organizations. It is no coincidence that the collective actors are placed in privileged positions in Scandinavia (Öberg, 2002). They are not rendered superfluous – as advertised in almost every neo-classical view – but are, on the contrary, rewarded with key roles in the systems. But then their internal capabilities and creative power for co-ordination in each country are put to a test. The coherence of the negotiation systems and collective acts of will are decisive factors behind the national adaptation capacity.

Trade unions in Scandinavian countries have been important actors in professional and political developments and they take responsibility accordingly – irrespective of the political colour of the government. It is not Social Democratic government alone that counts – but the government’s strength and ability to fulfil its agreements. The labour market organizations are both policy-makers and policy-takers; they act as major transmission belts between the labour market and the state, as banks of knowledge and information, as conflict mediators and as social stabilization agents. In Scandinavia, public and private representatives meet behind closed doors within the state apparatuses and in the municipalities; they phone each other every day; they meet in commissions and committees, in boards, councils and through lobbyist actions. This is both dependent on and creates mutual trust and compromises in society, even if the conflicts will always be there, when negotiations fail. Besides high levels of social participation and highly developed welfare systems, the Scandinavian countries exhibit the highest levels of generalized trust – that is social capital – in all Western societies (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). It seems that the Norwegian scientist Stein Rokkan (Rokkan, 1966, p. 105) was right in saying that “votes count but resources decide”, when it comes to judging the relative importance of the voter channel and the corporatist channel. In Sweden, the trade unions now seem to prefer parliamentary and governmental channels, and this is partly to be explained by the governmental position of the Social Democratic Party and the way the state has been restructuring the institutional settings, unseen in Denmark. Politicians and bureaucrats also accept and make use of both corporatism and lobbyism. Besides resources, the capabilities and strategic knowledge and actions of the organizations have been decisive for the powerful roles in social restructuring – and that means in securing wages and working conditions and restoring welfare state systems.

Literature.

Professor in political science and director of CARMA, Centre for Labour Market Research at Aalborg University, Denmark.

“Scandinavia” normally covers Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The phrase the “Nordic” countries includes Finland and sometimes Iceland as well. In this article only Denmark and Sweden are systematically covered as Norway is not a member of the EU, but references will also be given to Norwegian and Finnish experiences during the 1990s.

In Norway this happened in 1935, in Finland in 1944.

Unlike Denmark and Norway, where the use of membership ballots on draft agreements put a great deal of pressure on union negotiators, and in case the union members vote “no”, politicians are much keener to intervene politically in order to prevent general strikes and lockouts. In Norway, the extensive use of compulsory arbitration is also very important. In Denmark, the state has a mediator, who is given the right to aggregate ballot results from different sectors and unions in order to prevent a “no” response to the draft. Otherwise, blueprints for agreements are often transformed into laws.

Norway has no union unemployment insurance funds (which are run by the state) and with the absence of this institutional pillar for the trade unions lower density is to be expected. This is down to 56%.

But a trade union economist is now head of the National Labour Market Board, and the presidents of both the LO and the TCO are members of the board. In the second most important agency, the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health, a former president of an LO union has also been appointed General Director, flanked by one of LO’s vice-presidents.

Structural change on the side of the employers’ organizations during the first part of the decade called for new considerations and actions on behalf of LO, as central organizations’ authority is weakened in times of decentralization. The changes also stressed the central role of agenda-setting and participation in decision-making in public policies for the central organizations. And they have greatly intensified this.

In Norway , the LO (Confederation of Trade Unions, founded 1899) and the employers’ confederation, the NHO (founded 1900) have had key positions in the industrial relations system consisting of both centralized and decentralized elements in bargaining processes. During the past decades, several other organizations have also placed themselves as significant actors in the system, especially in the public sector. In the late 1970s, the Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations (AF) and the Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS) were established on the basis of earlier units and independent unions. As to questions of labour market policy, competence development, parental leave and pensions, the new trade unions have been very active in trying to influence public policy, even though they were excluded from many committees in the first half of the 1990s. Relative fragmentation of white-collar unions and the strong centralization of LO (compared to the Danish LO) and its close relationships to the Social Democratic Party account for this policy choice. The number of committees has now fallen, while more direct contacts with politicians and bureaucrats are rising.

Parallel developments have recently been seen in Finland . Here, the trade union movement was weak for a long time. Only at the end of the 1960s did SAK, the Finnish LO, start to have significant influence in wage formation and in public policy. This is also due to the fact that the Finnish Social Democratic Party never had as strong a position in society as in the other Nordic countries. In the trade union movement, there was a strong division between Social Democrats and Communists (now “the left alliance”) and this political fragmentation was followed by rivalry, free-riding and frequent strikes. Over the last two decades, the white-collar union STTK and the academic union Akava have been given more important roles alongside the FFC, the Confederation of Trade Unions.

In Norway and Finland, it was possible to revitalize centralized tripartism, which was given a key role in handling adaptation needs during the 1990s. In Norway , the 1990s might as well be called a period of loss of power on the side of the employers in public policy making, as the NHO lost a lockout battle in 1986 and after this experience did not dare to refuse social compromises. In 1992, a so-called “Solidarity Alternative” framed wage determination, incomes polices and social restructuring, and this social pact officially functioned until 1998, but it still plays a vital role for common understandings and coordinations. The firm basis of the Norwegian labour market regime was not shaken during the 1990s (see Dølvig and Stokke, 1998). The LO is in a strong position of power, even though the trade unions have fewer veto points than in Sweden and Denmark.

In Finland , more encounters between the bourgeois government and the trade unions occurred from 1991 to 1995, as the government tried to implement neo-liberal policies with new principles for wage determination. But the trade unions resisted so effectively that the line of incomes policy was not broken; incomes policy and social and tax policies were often negotiated together. A new government from 1995 again called for cooperation between the state and the social partners, and political corporatism functioned well again. But high and persistent unemployment put Finnish trade unions on the defensive in a dramatic way. They were unable to prevent low wage increases and social restructuring to the disadvantage of their members from taking place in the 1990s, and no social reforms were seen in Finland (Dølvig and Vartiainen, 2002). In 2000, a new social pact was blocked by a revolt against wage restraint within the LO. The Finnish labour movement never actually had a strong preference for major social reforms – unlike the Swedish trade unions political projects with wage earner funds and solidaristic wage policy.

Social restructuring in Scandinavia during the 1990s has taken different national directions, but no firm retrenchment policies have been implemented. Reforms of labour market regulation and social protection systems cannot be explained without reference to the trade unions. In corporatist arrangements and direct contacts to both politicians and bureaucrats they perform key political actor roles, influencing policies and public debates. The organizations have most important knowledge, resources, points of view and veto points in the systems, and they have used their resources and capabilities to avoid neo-liberal experiments in public policies during the last decade. The labour market organization s’ own collective bargaining systems are, however, also allocation of values and welfare elements, and both developments in industrial relations and social policies are investigated. Sweden has changed not only benefit levels but also decision systems more than Denmark and Norway, decentralizing industrial decision-making and decreasing the importance of administrative corporatism. Contrary to this, Denmark strengthened corporatism in the 90s, resulting in better labour market performance. No big systemic change has happened in Norway, but it goes for all three countries that path dependent developments can be recorded.

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